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1 This article is founded on three earlier published research papers by the
author, which will be cited:
(1) Paul B. Larsen, Space Traffic Management Standards, 83 J. AIR L. & COM. 359
(2018) [hereinafter Larsen, Space Traffic Management Standards];
(2) Paul B. Larsen, Solving the Space Debris Crisis, 83 J. AIR. L. & COM.
(forthcoming Nov. 2018) [hereinafter Larsen, Solving the Space Debris
Crisis];
(3) Paul B. Larsen, International Regulation of Near Earth Objects (NEOs), 67 ZLW
104 (2018) [hereinafter Larsen, NEOs].
It also addresses U.S. Space Policy Directive 3 (the Directive). See Memorandum
on National Space Traffic Management Policy, 83 Fed. Reg. 28,969 (June 18,
2018) [hereinafter U.S. Space Policy Directive 3]. The Directive was developed by
the Presidential Space Council, which was chaired by the Vice President and
signed by the President on June 18, 2018. See also Justin Bachman, Why Space
Desperately Needs a Traffic Cop, BLOOMBERG BUS. WK. (May 10, 2018), https://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-05-10/why-low-earth-orbit-desperately-
needs-a-traffic-cop (last visited Oct. 16, 2018); Glenn Peterson et al., Space Traffic
Management in the Age of New Space, AEROSPACE CORP. (Apr. 19, 2018), https://
aerospace.org/sites/default/files/2018-05/SpaceTrafficMgmt_0.pdf [https://
perma.cc/W7RS-9BRX].
* The author taught air and space law for more than forty years respectively at
Southern Methodist University and at Georgetown University. He is co-author of
FRANCIS LYALL & PAUL B. LARSEN, SPACE LAW: A TREATISE (2d ed. 2018), widely
used for teaching space law, and of PAUL B. LARSEN ET AL., AVIATION LAW: CASES,
LAWS AND RELATED SOURCES (2d ed. 2012).
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I. INTRODUCTION: CIVIL TECHNICAL NORMS FOR
OUTER SPACE ACTIVITIES
“NEW SPACE” ARRIVED with the sudden prospect ofthousands of small satellites being launched into orbit
and the realization that space traffic management (STM), space
debris, and Near-Earth Object (NEO) problems need to be re-
solved so that New Space activities can be safe.2 Present-day com-
mercial activities in outer space are changing the way we
function extraterrestrially.3 Earth and our space-related infra-
structure are threatened by traffic congestion, collisions with
satellites and space debris, and NEOs.4 Technical norms must
be developed so that commercial opportunities in outer space
2 Peterson et al., supra note 1, at 2–3.
3 See Gbenga Oduntan, Aspects of the International Legal Regime Concerning Priva-
tization and Commercialization of Space Activities, 17 GEO. J. INT’L AFF. 79 (2016).
4 See Asteroids and Space Debris Come Together for the First Time, EUR. SPACE AGENCY
(June 13, 2018), http://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Operations/Asteroids_and_
space_debris_come_together_for_the_first_time [https://perma.cc/5H4P-
GEBS].
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can be realized and enlightening scientific exploration can
continue.
Outer space is unique because no country can claim it; only
international agreements can coordinate all the moving parts.
This article examines the nature of those moving parts and pro-
poses an international coordinating structure to establish and
maintain technical international customs. Section I segregates
economic and military issues from areas that are within the pur-
view of the proposed technical norms. Section II states the bene-
fits of technical norms. Section III explains the proposed norms.
Section IV lists the individual stakeholders that will benefit from
this proposition. Section V is a resume´ of existing applicable in-
ternational regulations affecting the proposed norms. Section
VI describes possible models for a legal framework that could
manage the necessary international norms. Finally, after discuss-
ing four potential models for managing the new customers, sec-
tion VII recommends the International Civil Aviation
Organization’s (ICAO) model for organizing international tech-
nical norms.
Uniform norms for outer space activities received a significant
boost when the United States issued U.S. Space Policy Directive
3 (the Directive) on June 18, 2018.5 The Directive recognizes
the need for safety norms to protect growth and innovation in
the commercial outer space sector.6 It will immediately affect
American development of uniform STM and management of
space debris. However, the Directive also supports ultimate in-
ternational norms and standards7 and recommends technical
guidelines, standards, behavior norms, risk assessments, and in-
orbit collision avoidance service.8 It commits the United States
to:
[d]evelop STM standards and best practices. As the leader in
space, the United States supports the development of opera-
tional standards and best practices to promote safe and responsi-
ble behavior in space. A critical first step in carrying out that goal
is to develop U.S.-led minimum safety standards and best prac-
tices to coordinate space traffic. U.S. regulatory agencies should,
as appropriate, adopt these standards and best practices in do-
5 U.S. Space Policy Directive 3, supra note 1, at 28,969.
6 Id.
7 See id. at 28,970.
8 See id. at 28,971.
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mestic regulatory frameworks and use them to inform and help
shape international consensus practices and standards.9
It is emphasized that this article is about establishing interna-
tional technical safety norms. These are norms to be implemented
by countries world-wide so that everybody will be operating
under the same rules to make outer space operations safer. The
norms would not interfere with existing space law. For example,
economic space exploitation would continue to be regulated by
existing national laws and multilateral and bilateral treaties be-
cause economic exploitation of outer space is a separate issue
from STM, space debris, and NEOs. This approach conforms
with the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States
in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon
and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty)10 distinction
between exploration of outer space and economic exploitation.
Exploration is unrestricted, whereas other uses, including eco-
nomic exploitation, are constrained.11
The fundamental division between exploration and economic
exploitation was not only established in the Outer Space
9 Id. The need for standardized international outer space practices has previ-
ously been considered in the context of international transparency of space situa-
tional awareness information. See David A. Koplow, The Fault Is Not in Our Stars:
Avoiding an Arms Race in Outer Space, 59 HARV. INT’L. L.J. 331, 377–78 (2018). In
particular, note the section entitled “Precedents for Shared SSA in Arms Con-
trol.” See id. at 379–82.
10 The relevant space law treaties include:
(1) Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,
Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space
Treaty].
(2) Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Nov.
12, 1974, 28 U.S.T. 695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15 [hereinafter UN Registration
Convention].
(3) Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Ob-
jects, Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Liability
Convention].
(4) Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts, and the
Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T.
7570, 672 U.N.T.S. 119 [hereinafter Rescue and Return Agreement].
(5) Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Ce-
lestial Bodies, Dec. 5, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Moon
Agreement].
11 See generally FRANCIS LYALL & PAUL B. LARSEN, SPACE LAW: A TREATISE 54, 64
(2d ed. 2018).
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Treaty;12 exploitation was made subject to a separate interna-
tional treaty by Article 11 of the 1979 Moon Agreement (Moon
Agreement), which declared the Moon and celestial bodies sub-
ject to a special economic regulation.13 Although the Moon
Agreement has been adopted by only eighteen states, putting
economic exploitation into a separate category reflects the
states’ rationale expressed in the Outer Space Treaty and the
Moon Agreement negotiations.14 The proposed international
technical norms regarding space debris, space traffic, and NEO
threat prevention, on one hand, and economic exploitation, on
the other, may be viewed as separate explications of the Outer
Space Treaty and the Moon Agreement.15
How do we know a civil outer space regime would work? All
international transport of goods by air and sea depend on civil-
ian treaties.16 Civilian regulation is the most effective method to
manage space issues. Relevant to the establishment of civil outer
space norms is an important precedent established in 1944, dur-
ing World War II. At that time, the United States convened an
international diplomatic conference in Chicago for the purpose
of coordinating post-war international aviation.17 Because of the
ongoing war, most aviation at that time was for military pur-
poses.18 It was not possible for the nations convened in Chicago
in 1944 to conduct any negotiations about military aviation;19
thus, the negotiations in Chicago were limited to civil aircraft as
evidenced by Article 3 of the Chicago Convention.20 The war
12 Article II of the Outer Space Treaty maintains that restriction on appropria-
tion of celestial bodies is basically a restriction on exploitation. Id. at 54–56; STE-
PHEN HOBE ET AL., COLOGNE COMMENTARY ON SPACE LAW VOL. I 49 (2009).
13 Moon Agreement, supra note 10, art. 11; LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 11, at
176–82;. STEPHEN HOBE ET AL., COLOGNE COMMENTARY ON SPACE LAW VOL. II
394–95 (2013).
14 See Moon Agreement, supra note 10, at 22; Outer Space Treaty, supra note
10, 610 U.N.T.S. at 206–207.
15 See Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180,
15 U.N.T.S. 295 [hereinafter Chicago Convention]. The Chicago Convention
also left economic issues outside of that Convention.
16 See, e.g., Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International
Carriage by Air, May 28, 1999, T.I.A.S. 13,038, 2242 U.N.T.S. 309 [hereinafter
Montreal Convention].
17 PAUL B. LARSEN ET AL., AVIATION LAW: CASES, LAWS AND RELATED SOURCES
36–39 (2d ed. 2012) (discussing the Chicago Convention).
18 See id.
19 See id.
20 Chicago Convention, supra note 15, 15 U.N.T.S. at 298. The separation of
civil and military activities affected by the Chicago Convention is actually broader
than just civil and military aircraft because the separation in Article 3(a) is be-
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had spurred great technological developments in aviation, re-
sulting in large, dependable airplanes.21 It was apparent that a
post-war world market for global air transport had emerged.22
States had anticipated the Chicago Conference to be a forum
for establishing order in this marketplace.23 However, the then-
British Commonwealth, which spanned the globe, controlled
the post-war marketplace for international air transportation.24
The United States possessed the aviation technology for exploit-
ing the world marketplace because the U.S. development of
larger bomber airplanes could be adapted to serve as commer-
cial airplanes.25 Aviation was the main issue left for negotiation,
but because the United Kingdom wanted to delay negotiation of
international air routes until it could recover economic strength
after the war,26 successful negotiation of economic exploitation
failed in Chicago in 1944.27 However, the conference negotia-
tion did result in the very successful Chicago Convention and in
the creation of the ICAO, the members of which created inter-
national standards for a safe international civil aviation net-
work.28 The states participating in the Chicago Conference
created the ICAO to establish international technical norms for
aviation in the form of international standards and recom-
mended practices.29 These standards and procedures were pro-
duced by experts in the Air Navigation Commission and, once
approved by the ICAO Council, became international
mandatory standards.30 However, individual states retained the
tween civil and state aircraft. Article 3(b) importantly defined state aircraft as
“[a]ircraft used for military, customs and police services.” If the same separation
language were to be used in any new regime for outer space, that would catego-
rize satellites operated by NASA and other government authorities, including
ESA, as civil satellites.
21 See LARSEN ET AL., supra note 17, at 36–38.
22 See id. at 37.
23 See id. at 38.
24 See id. at 37.
25 See id. at 39.
26 See id. at 37.
27 See id. at 39; see also Chicago Convention, supra note 15, at 15 U.N.T.S. at
320–22.
28 See Minutes of the First Plenary Meeting, INT’L CIVIL AVIATION ORG. (Jan. 6,
1950), https://www.icao.int/assembly-archive/Session4/A.4.MIN.1.P.EN.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YJY2-7G8C].
29 Chicago Convention, supra note 15, art. 37; LARSEN ET AL., supra note 17, at
56, 58.
30 See LARSEN ET AL., supra note 17, at 56.
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right to file deviations from international standards as provided
in Article 38 of the Chicago Convention.31
Separating military from civil uses is now common practice
for international commercial enterprises.32 The International
Maritime Organization (IMO) does not regulate maritime mili-
tary activities.33 The International Telecommunication Union
(ITU) also does not regulate military radiofrequencies or their
related orbital slots.34 The ITU’s military exception may be the
most relevant precedent for discussion of outer space norms be-
cause the ITU’s civil regulations apply in outer space and are
acceptable to military authorities.
Separation of military uses of outer space from its civil uses
leaves military uses to international regulation in the United Na-
tions (UN) Disarmament Commission and other UN commit-
tees, as well as to multilateral and bilateral arrangements outside
of the UN, in addition to national regulation. It also leaves mili-
tary operators free to use whatever regulations are developed for
civil space at their discretion. Experience shows that military
users appreciate the greater safety that results from using the
uniform international air navigation standards.35 In fact, the mil-
itary is also threatened by unregulated space activities that lead
to military traffic collisions with other space objects and space
debris. Any improvement in civilian traffic rules and space deb-
ris avoidances would diminish interferences with military opera-
tions. Order in outer space would also leave military operations
free to follow civilian traffic rules, as has actually happened in
military aviation, maritime traffic, and space
telecommunication.
II. BENEFITS OF INTERNATIONAL NORMS
A. PUBLIC SAFETY BENEFIT
Commercial space operations are more vulnerable than mili-
tary activities. They need regulatory protection from threatening
31 Id.; Chicago Convention, supra note 15, art. 38.
32 See LARSEN ET AL., supra note 17, at 41–42.
33 Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization,
Mar. 6, 1948, 9 U.S.T. 61, 289 U.N.T.S. 48 [hereinafter IMO Convention].
34 See Constitution of the International Telecommunication Union, reprinted in
COLLECTION OF THE BASIC TEXTS ADOPTED BY THE PLENIPOTENTIARY CONFERENCE,
http://search.itu.int/historyDigitalCollectionDocLibrary/5.21.61.en.100.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WC8J-JMAX] [hereinafter ITU Constitution].
35 See Michel Bourbonniere & Louis Haeck, Military Aircraft and International
Law: Chicago Opus 3, 66 J. AIR L. & COM. 885, 888 (2001).
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elements, such as space debris from collision with other satel-
lites. Moreover, uncertainties raised by NEOs threaten all com-
mercial satellites, regardless of their nationality. As governments
authorize more launches of commercial satellites, potential for
damage to and interference with current space operations
grows.36 These dangers are greatest for the United States, which
has the most exposure in terms of space investment and
technology.37
Loss of satellites from collisions can be financially ruinous.
Operators need to know where other satellites and space debris
are located in outer space. Operators need to have exclusive ra-
dio frequencies and orbital slots for safe navigation and control
of their satellites. Space traffic management and rules of the
road for outer space are now necessary for safe operations in
outer space.38
Commercial operators do not have policing powers in outer
space. Only states can establish and enforce STM under current
rules. Only states can manage and provide exclusive radiofre-
quencies and orbital slots free of interferences. Only states can
save operators from the growing dangers of collisions with space
debris. However, states do not have exclusive sovereignty in
outer space; therefore, they need to coordinate and cooperate
with other states and to arrange for uniform international
norms so that national regulations do not conflict with opera-
tors authorized by other nations.
B. EFFICIENCY
International norms are needed for efficient commercial op-
erations in outer space. Coordinated international standards
would be more efficient and less confusing than would one hun-
dred different sets of norms set by individual national agencies.
The ability to operate without interference from other operators
and free from space debris will create better results for organiza-
36 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 10, art. VI.
37 U.S. Space Policy Directive 3, supra note 1, at 28, 969–70; Koplow, supra note
9, at 382.
38 See U.S. Space Policy Directive 3, supra note 1, at 28, 969–70; Koplow, supra
note 9, at 332. Experts predict that there could be up to 27,000 operating satel-
lites in outer space in the next ten years. Irene Klotz, Small Satellites, Big Data,
AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., July 30–Aug. 19, 2018, at 48, 49; Yousaf Butt, Opin-
ion, Avoiding Traffic Pileups in Outer Space, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/opinion/space-race-regulation.html (last visited
Oct. 16, 2018); see Irene Klotz, Space Cop, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., May 7–20,
2018, at 19.
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tions doing business in space. States could organize efficient
commercial environments in outer space by coordinating and
cooperating with other states. Operators in regulated outer
space would be free from having to negotiate terms with a vari-
ety of other commercial operators because there would already
be an agreed-upon, worldwide standard.
C. CONFLICT PREVENTION
Article II of the Outer Space Treaty specifically outlaws claims
of exclusive appropriation.39 Each state has an equal legal right
to operate in outer space,40 so no state can be the exclusive user
by excluding other states and their operators from also using
celestial bodies. Nevertheless, conflicts and occasional assertions
of exclusive use occur.41 Conflicts lead to delays and to possible
loss of and damage to space objects. Only coordination and co-
operation among states will result in establishing conflict-free
environments in which operators can conduct profitable
businesses.
D. COMMERCIAL OPERATORS’ NEEDS FOR ORDER IN
OUTER SPACE
The current shift from military to commercial space enter-
prises has made the operators of the commercial endeavors ap-
prehensive about heavy-handed governmental regulation.42 On
the one hand, commercial space operators require “agile, trans-
parent, and internationally coordinated rule-making to make it
sustainable.”43 Too much regulation can kill the commercial
revolution.44 On the other hand, the current launches and
planned launches of thousands of commercial satellites threaten
collisions among satellites and with space debris. Commercial
operators have come to appreciate government regulation of
39 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 10, art. II.
40 Id. arts. I, II.
41 See, e.g., Dominic Basulto, How Property Rights in Outer Space May Lead to a




42 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 10, arts. I, II; Butt, supra note 38; Paul B.
Larsen, Berlin Space Protocol: Update, 64 ZLW 361, 361–62 (2015).
43 Butt, supra note 38.
44 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 10, arts. I, II; Butt, supra note 38; see generally
Larsen, Berlin Space Protocol, supra note 42, at 361–62.
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space traffic and reduction of debris dangers.45 The collision
danger led a 2018 study by the Aerospace Corporation to con-
clude that “[t]o facilitate the envisioned New Space activity and
maintain a safe operating environment for everyone in space,
the issues of establishing an effective next-step STM conjunction
assessment system must be addressed as soon as possible.”46
The question is how to develop internationally-needed regula-
tion without killing the many valuable start-up enterprises now
fueling the commercial revolution. Again, the Chicago Conven-
tion shows the way. At the conference, there were active industry
experts not only advising but also actually negotiating through
working groups.47 Perhaps most valuable for the aviation indus-
try was the participation and contributions of the then-general
counsel for Pan-American Airlines, John Cobb Cooper.48
Through industry participation, the commercial enterprises
were able to not only contribute but also guide the formation of
the new Convention on International Civil Aviation. A similar
infusion of active commercial guidance will be needed for a cor-
responding new regime establishing norms on space debris and
STM, so that the many dangers that threaten commercial space
operations can be avoided.
E. WHERE TO BEGIN
It is important to note that, while this discussion is about in-
ternational space traffic norms, the actual implementation of in-
ternational, uniform norms would be by the individual states.
Negotiation of a separate treaty to establish international norms
45 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 10, arts. I, II; Butt, supra note 38; see generally
Larsen, Berlin Space Protocol, supra note 42. The Department of Defense operates a
comprehensive outer space tracking system able to track objects larger than ten
centimeters in diameter. Koplow, supra note 9, at 373. This tracking information
is available to civilian satellite operators. See id. at 374–75. This tracking capability
is currently being improved to track ten times more space objects. Id. at 373.
46 Peterson et al., supra note 1, at 9.
47 See Int’l Civil Aviation Org., List of Delegates, https://www.icao.int/Chicago
Conference/Pages/Chicago-conference-delegates.aspx [https://perma.cc/
C7GR-U2J6].
48 See Minutes of the First Plenary Meeting, supra note 28. Pan-American Airlines
was the major U.S. international air carrier at that time. See Pan American World
Airways, Inc., ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Pan-
American-World-Airways-Inc [https://perma.cc/YFB3-BSU5]. Professor Cooper
later founded the Institute of Air and Space Law at McGill University. Obituary,
John Cooper, 79, Air Lawyer, Dies: Pan Am Executive Devised Code for Outer Space, N.Y.
TIMES, July 24, 1967, at 26. He also wrote a foundational book air law book, The
Right to Fly, in 1947. Id.
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for space debris, space traffic, and NEO defense would very
likely begin in the UN Committee on the Peaceful Use of Space
(COPUOS) Legal Committee. It would be approved by the full
committee then finalized by a diplomatic conference. Alterna-
tively, the new regime could become a protocol to the Outer
Space Treaty the same way the 2012 Berlin Space Protocol be-
came a protocol to the Cape Town Convention.49 The result
would be a protocol that would only become binding on parties
to it. However, all the space-interested states would want to ratify
as soon as possible in order to gain the advantages of the new
safety norms. Consequently, traffic in outer space would become
orderly, the debris problem would become less urgent, and the
Kessler Syndrome prospect of foreclosure of access to outer
space would disappear.
III. THE SCOPE OF INTERNATIONAL TECHNICAL
REGULATION OF CIVIL SPACE ACTIVITIES
The following section will discuss establishment of interna-
tional operating norms for STM, space debris, and NEOs.
A. INTERNATIONAL NORMS FOR CIVIL STM50
Travel in outer space is highly dangerous. One danger is the
tremendous speed at which space objects move.51 Available assis-
tance is minimal, and collisions are likely to be catastrophic.
There are currently no uniform norms for traffic in outer
space.52 With increasing traffic and more obstacles to navigate
around, indications are that travel in outer space may eventually
49 Larsen, Berlin Space Protocol, supra note 42, at 362–63, 365–66.
50 For a more detailed discussion, see Larsen, Space Traffic Management
Standards, supra note 1.
51 See Mark Garcia, Space Debris and Human Space Craft, NAT’L AERONAUTICS &
SPACE ADMIN. (Aug. 7, 2017), https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/station/
news/orbital_debris.html [https://perma.cc/M249-K7LZ].
52 Peterson et al., supra note 1. Most of the traffic is non-navigable space deb-
ris. Id. Note also the collision of the commercial U.S. Iridium satellite with the
defunct Russian Cosmos satellite and the destruction of the Chinese Fengyun IC
weather satellite by a Chinese ASAT weapon. See Becky Iannotta & Tariq Malik,
U.S. Satellite Destroyed in Space Collision, SPACE.COM (Feb. 11, 2009), https://
www.space.com/5542-satellite-destroyed-space-collision.html [https://perma.cc/
QWT3-ZHNE]; Leonard David, China’s Anti-Satellite Test: Worrisome Debris Cloud
Circles Earth, SPACE.COM (Feb. 2, 2007), https://www.space.com/3415-china-anti-
satellite-test-worrisome-debris-cloud-circles-earth.html [https://perma.cc/52KL-
NHP7].
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become impossible unless uniform traffic norms are
established.53
The advantage of international STM norms is that all naviga-
ble traffic would use the same uniform traffic rules. Interna-
tional STM is in constant need of updating. These norms would
have to be administered, analyzed, and supplemented by knowl-
edgeable experts as traffic conditions change. The result would
be greater safety.54
Traffic in outer space is increasing drastically in the New
Space age. There are currently more than 1,200 functional satel-
lites in orbit.55 Estimates of satellites to be launched into orbit in
the immediate future range up to 27,000 satellites.56 Most of the
new launches are expected to be in low Earth orbit.57 The
amount of space debris in orbit is also increasing rapidly. There
is estimated to be close to 1 million debris objects in orbit, of
which only approximately 23,000 are currently being tracked,
although new tracking technology now being deployed will in-
crease tracking capability four-fold.58 The point is that the total-
ity of outer space traffic congestion is increasing rapidly.
For new launches to be safely orbited, new international STM
is urgently needed. Individual states supervise the traffic that
they authorize,59 and while states may try to track the space ob-
jects60 launched by other states, current tracking technology still
leaves some space objects untracked. For example, when the re-
53 The Kessler Syndrome predicts the foreclosure of outer space unless the
current trend in space debris is reversed. See Donald J. Kessler & Burton G. Cour-
Palais, Collision Frequency of Artificial Satellites: The Creation of a Debris Belt, 83 J.
GEOPHYSICAL RES. 2637, 2637 (1978). According to the Kessler Syndrome, space
debris of critical mass will fragment in further collisions, leading to cascading
chain activity. See Donald J. Kessler et al., The Kessler Syndrome: Implications to Future
Space Operations, 33RD ANNUAL AAS GUIDANCE AND CONTROL CONFERENCE, at 2
(Feb. 6–10, 2010) http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.
394.6767&rep=rep1&type=pdf [https://perma/cc/PQ7Y-XTL8].
54 The need for safety standards and norms for outer space activities is stressed
by the U.S. Space Policy Directive 3, supra note 1, at 28,969.
55 See Andrew Lavender, How Many Satellites Are Orbiting the Earth in 2018?, PIX-
ALYTICS LTD. (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.pixalytics.com/sats-orbiting-the-earth-
2018/ [https://perma.cc/6NLC-BG5M].
56 Klotz, Small Satellites, Big Data, supra note 38, at 49.
57 Id. at 49–50.
58 See Mike Gruss, Good (Space) Fences Make for Good (Orbital) Neighbors, SPACE
NEWS (Sept. 19, 2016), https://spacenews.com/good-space-fences-make-for-
good-orbital-neighbors/ [https://perma.cc/N2WT-EVGT].
59 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 10, art. VI.
60 The term “space objects” is here used to include both functioning satellites
and space debris.
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sponsible state lacks the capability to track objects, it may simply
warn space operators to avoid the general location of its ex-
isting, known space objects. Additionally, some objects are so
small that they cannot be safely tracked.61
Below is a tentative list of potential civil uniform international
space traffic norms (Standards and Procedures).62 Eventually,




(4) Standards for safety zones;65
(5) Space traffic control procedures;66
(6) Procedures regarding navigable traffic interaction with
non-navigable objects such as space debris;
(7) Operational licensing procedures;67
(8) Standards streamlining registration;68
(9) Information procedures regarding space flight
conditions;
(10) Records requirements;
(11) Standards for navigational aids;
(12) Search and rescue procedures;
(13) Accident investigation procedures;
(14) ITU coordination of radio frequencies and related orbi-
tal slots;
(15) Customs and immigration; and
(16) Other norms appropriate to traffic in space.
It is apparent from the variety of subjects that several expert sub-
committees would need to be formed to generate norms. That
61 Swarm Technologies launched untrackable, small satellites without the Fed-
eral Communications Commission’s authorization. See Butt, supra note 38; see also
discussion infra note 82.
62 See Larsen, Space Traffic Management Standards, supra note 1, at 385.
63 This was suggested by The Hague Space Resources Governance Working
Group. See Final Report, THE HAGUE SPACE RESOURCES GOVERNANCE WORKING GRP.






66 Space traffic norms will need to distinguish navigation in space from naviga-
tion on celestial bodies. Reference is also made to the Outer Space Treaty Article
IX requirement to pay due regard to others in outer space. Id.
67 See id.
68 U.S. Space Policy Directive 3, supra note 1, at 28,971.
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became the accepted procedure of the ICAO, IMO, and ITU in
drafting standard practices.
B. INTERNATIONAL NORMS FOR REDUCED SPACE DEBRIS
GENERATION AND FOR REMOVAL OF OLD DEBRIS69
The space debris dilemma is in desperate need of interna-
tional resolution70 in order to preserve continued access to
outer space.71 At the moment, there is no solution in sight for
reducing existing, accumulated debris that continues to expand
at the rate explained by the Kessler Syndrome.72 Despite the In-
ter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee’s (IADC)73
voluntary space debris guidelines, new additions of debris can-
not be avoided. The IADC guidelines, while recommended by
COPUOS, are now technically enforced by the individual states
but are not applied uniformly or enforced well. Existing space
regulations do not sufficiently deter generation of additional
debris.74 The existing trend of increasing conjunctions in outer
space is illustrated by the collision of the commercial satellite,
U.S. Iridium, with the defunct Russian Cosmos satellite, as well
as the destruction of the Chinese Fengyun IC weather satellite
by a Chinese ASAT weapon.75 Those conjunctions produced
massive amounts of new debris that in turn increased the danger
of satellite collisions with other space objects.76
The wave of new commercial activity in outer space is gener-
ated by the New Space initiatives relating primarily to small
satellites. Small satellite systems are being launched for satellite
communication (for example, internet access) and reconnais-
69 For detailed discussion, see Larsen, Solving the Space Debris Crisis, supra note
1.
70 U.S. Space Policy Directive 3, supra note 1, at 28,970. The Directive stresses
the need to reduce space debris, stating that the U.S. Government Orbital Debris
Mitigations Standard Practices are inadequate. Practices should be updated to
meet current and future space operating environments. See Bachman, supra note
1.
71 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 10, art. I.
72 See Kessler et al., supra note 53, at 14.
73 See generally Nicholas Johnson, Origin of the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordina-
tion Committee, NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN., https://ntrs.nasa.gov/
archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20150003818.pdf [https://perma.cc/8T6S-
EY9N]. The independent IADC is a committee of the thirteen countries most
active in outer space. See INTER-AGENCY SPACE DEBRIS COORDINATION COMM.,
https://www.iadc-online.org [https://perma.cc/6PDH-D9P9].
74 See Kessler et al., supra note 53, at 14.
75 See Iannotta & Malik, supra note 52; see David, supra note 52.
76 See David, supra note 52.
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sance, as well as remote sensing and Earth observation.77 The
life span of these small satellites is very short (as little as one to
two years), at which time the small satellites need to be de-
orbited or sent into graveyard orbits and subsequently replaced.
So, despite IADC’s attempt at regulation, the amount of debris
will increase due to inadequate policing and new generation of
debris.78
The wealth of new space business initiatives is creating great
pressure from the space industry for speedy government grant
of authorizations.79 Some operators try to shortcut the licensing
wait time by shopping around, comparing the policies of various
countries and searching for the quickest issuance of governmen-
tal authorization.80 Some states are tempted to become “flag of
convenience” states because the space business can be lucrative,
bringing not only wealth but also employment to small countries
that have inadequate resources to supervise the space activities
that they have authorized.81
A current international problem is that COPUOS has no deci-
sion-making authority. While it is presently the designated fo-
rum for international discussions of space debris problems,
COPUOS is merely a committee of the UN General Assembly
(UNGA) and can only make recommendations to the Assembly.
That handicaps the ability of COPUOS to resolve the space deb-
ris problem. COPUOS is also disadvantaged by its use of consen-
sus for making decisions and recommendations to the UNGA.
COPUOS’s space debris activity depends on the independent
IADC,82 which means representatives from the thirteen most
space-active countries must agree. International space debris de-
cision-making is, therefore, weak. Furthermore, IADC lacks geo-
graphical distribution. Its guidelines are voluntary, so it has no
enforcement authority. Finally, its space debris guidelines have
not been amended since 2007,83 so the IADC space debris
guidelines are already out of date.
77 See, e.g., Lavender, supra note 55.
78 See David, supra note 53; Larsen, Solving the Space Debris Crisis, supra note 1.
79 See Butt, supra note 38.
80 See id.
81 See LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 11, at 517–18.
82 Johnson, supra note 73, at 71.
83 See IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines, INTER-AGENCY SPACE DEBRIS
COORD. COMMITTEE (Sept. 2007), https://www.iadc-online.org/index.cgi?item
=docs_pub [https://perma.cc/B433-FH5B].
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COPUOS does not appear to be able to regulate the purely
technical aspects of space debris, nor does it appear to be suited
for such an undertaking.84 COPUOS is unable to adopt or en-
force mandatory norms and standards to regulate space debris
to the extent necessary to resolve space debris problems.85
Considering that the existing space debris decision-making
fora are unable to resolve the problem, both governments and
industry are beginning to look elsewhere for decision-making
action. Because outer space is non-sovereign and individual
states do not have legal authority to exercise sovereign control
over policing of outer space, there is now a search for an inter-
national authority that can exercise the necessary policing. Con-
sidering the magnitude of the problem and the speed with
which it is currently accelerating, there is no time to waste wait-
ing for states to agree to an effective international regulation of
space debris.
Particularly dangerous are errant commercial companies like
Swarm Technologies86 that are tempted to launch space objects
without international coordination or authorization by their
governments on the assumption that outer space is so big and
open that there is room for doing business without conferring
with the government and other interested organizations. Re-
sponsible commercial operators will necessarily opt for mini-
mum government policing in outer space using internationally
agreed norms. Those norms must be strong enough to reduce
the space debris problem gradually rather than letting it grow
beyond eventual possible solutions, which could end in foreclo-
sure of all commercial and non-commercial space activities.
Such a result would also disrupt continuing scientific explora-
tion of outer space.87
This tentative list of possible civil uniform international space
debris norms is for illustration only and is based on the guide-
lines established by the IADC space debris experts:
84 See Johnson, supra note 73, at 71.
85 Id.
86 See Butt, supra note 38.
87 See Johnson, supra note 73, at 70–71; see Butt, supra note 38 (commenting on
Swarm Technologies); see also Ian Christensen & Josh Wolny, Insight: CubeSats and
the FCC: The Sky is Not Falling, SECURE WORLD FOUND. (Aug. 2, 2018), https://
swfound.org/news/all-news/2018/08/insight-cubesats-and-the-fcc-the-sky-is-not-
falling [https://perma.cc/H4BJ-EWYA] (discussing FCC regulation of applica-
tions for radio frequencies).
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(1) Limits on space debris during normal operations by satel-
lites, launch rockets, and their component parts;
(2) Limits on break-ups during operational phases;
(3) Norms for diminishment of accidental debris-causing col-
lisions in space;
(4) Methods of tracking debris caused by collisions of space
objects;
(5) Prohibition or limitation of intentional destruction of
space objects;
(6) Required removal of the most dangerous debris;
(7) Limits on post-mission break-ups resulting from stored
energy;
(8) Required deorbit from low earth orbits;
(9) Required removal from geostationary orbit into graveyard
orbits; and
(10) Registration of known debris.
A number of different expert sub-groups would need to be es-
tablished to adequately cover these topics.
C. INTERNATIONAL TECHNICAL PROTOCOLS TO PROTECT EARTH
FROM THREATENING NEOS88
Asteroids have, in past times, collided with and caused dam-
age to Earth.89 NEOs of many different sizes frequently reach
Earth’s atmosphere. While most NEOs burn up in the atmos-
phere, some reach Earth’s surface and have caused great dam-
age in the past.90 For example, one NEO exploded over a city in
Siberia in 2013.91 It would have caused considerably more dam-
age if it had collided with Earth in a heavily-populated area,
such as New York, London, or Beijing. Most asteroids orbit the
Sun in the asteroid belt between Mars and Jupiter,92 and most
NEOs can be watched in order to predict their paths. However,
88 A NEO is any small Solar System body (asteroid) whose orbit can bring it
into proximity with Earth. NEO Basics, NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN.,
https://cneos.jpl.nasa.gov/about/basics.html [https://perma.cc/NPZ2-8AJB]
(last visited Sept. 5, 2018).
89 See, e.g., Brett Line, Asteroid Impacts: 10 Biggest Known Hits, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC
NEWS (Feb. 15, 2013), https://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2013/13/
130214-biggest-asteroid-impacts-meteorites-space-2012da14/ [https://perma.cc/
RD3E-FKDP].
90 For detailed discussion, see Larsen, NEOs, supra note 1, at 104.
91 Id. at 104, 107.
92 See Matt Williams, What Is the Asteroid Belt?, UNIVERSE TODAY (Aug. 23, 2015),
https://www.universetoday.com/32856/asteroid-belt/ [https://perma.cc/UYR5-
3HS7].
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intergalactic celestial bodies, such as the one that entered the
solar system in 2017,93 cannot be predicted. NEOs are being ob-
served by the United States,94 Russia, Japan, China, the UK, Ca-
nada, India, and other states. Each of these countries is
primarily searching for NEOs that threaten their national inter-
ests. Unnecessary duplication of national preventive efforts may
occur due to lack of coordination when several states focus on
common NEO dangers. For example, one state may merely wish
to shift the collision danger from its state over to an adjoining
state, thereby adversely impacting a neighboring nation rather
than working together to protect both countries’ interests. Since
most national space activities are inherently dual use, tracking
and many other preventive activities occur through military
agencies. The use of military weaponry, such as atomic bombs,
may be needed in the future to deflect NEOs,95 and this may
invite international military conflict. Military space technology is
developing very quickly and may result from unilateral national
space activities, but this also raises issues of technology transfers.
Individual national planning and actions regarding threaten-
ing NEOs can easily lead to conflicts when several states decide
to act to meet NEO threats. States may perceive NEOs differ-
ently. For example, the United States has plans to seize an aster-
oid and place it in orbit around the Moon for observation and
scientific study.96 Other states may have different plans for the
same asteroids and may challenge the legal right of the United
States to appropriate a particular asteroid.97
International worldwide protocols to avoid NEOs are neces-
sary. Joint strategies would be more economical and efficient.
Transparency is needed to avoid mistaken assumptions about
93 See Small Asteroid or Comet “Visits” from Beyond the Solar System, NAT’L AERONAU-
TICS & SPACE ADMIN. (Oct. 26, 2017), http://www.nasa.gov/feature/jpl/small-as-
teroid-or-comet-visits-from-beyond-the-solar-system [https://perma.cc/J8UE-
RWGB].
94 See National Near-Earth Object Preparedness Strategy and Action Plan, NAT’L SCI.
& TECH. COUNCIL (June 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/
uploads/2018/06/National-Near-Earth-Object-Preparedness-Strategy-and-Action-
Plan-23-pages-1MB.pdf [https://perma.cc/DJ87-ZUCM].
95 NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN., NEAR-EARTH OBJECT SURVEY AND DE-
FLECTION ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES 2, 20 (Mar. 2007), https://www.nasa.gov/
pdf/171331main_NEO_report_march07.pdf [https://perma.cc/GK78-R67A].
96 See What Is NASA’s Asteroid Redirect Mission?, NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE AD-
MIN., https://www.nasa.gov/content/what-is-nasa-s-asteroid-redirect-mission
[https://perma.cc/7KW2-G4QF].
97 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 10, art. II (prohibiting appropriation of ce-
lestial bodies).
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other states’ intentions because misapprehensions may lead to
military engagements. This openness, especially about military
actions, would lessen international tensions, and coordination
between nations would lead to greater safety in outer space.
The UN has begun international coordination of national ef-
forts to protect Earth from NEO dangers. COPUOS has formed
two independent and unfunded international groups to advise it
on NEO issues.98 The first group is the International Asteroid
Warning Network (IAWN), which is a group of experts, mainly
astronomers and astronomic observatories.99 IAWN members
share observations individually as well as jointly. They generally
assist governments in dealing with NEO impacts and provide
NEO observations. They warn governments about impending
NEO collisions with Earth and analyze the potential conse-
quences of such collisions. The second group is the Space Mis-
sion Planning Advisory Group (SMPAG), which is another
independent, unfunded COPUOS advisory group whose mem-
bers are from national space agencies such as NASA, the DLR
(German Space Agency), and the ESA (European Space
Agency).100 This group prepares plans for national and interna-
tional action in the event of NEO impacts. It also prepares
guidelines for mitigating future threats, such as NEO diversion.
Currently neither group has any decision-making authority.101
Except for joint international actions on international peace
and security, such decision-making authority would be beyond
the authority of the United Nations. Even if the IAWN or the
SMPAG informs COPUOS of impending threats, the interna-
tional community does not have an international regulatory
framework for establishing norms that would prepare the world
for NEO threats, how to meet such threats, diversion of NEOs,
or recovery from NEO strikes. With no international coordina-
tion, such known threats could cause confusion about which
divertive actions to take. Alternatively, the states could be moti-
vated to agree on new legal norms for joint action against the
98 Larsen, NEOs, supra note 1, at 123–25; see also UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR
OUTER SPACE AFFAIRS, NEAR-EARTH OBJECTS AND PLANETARY DEFENCE 12 (2018),
http://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/smpag/st_space_073E.pdf [https://
perma.cc/2PC2-5MWG].
99 NEAR-EARTH OBJECTS AND PLANETARY DEFENCE, supra note 98, at 12, 15.
100 Id. at 13, 16; UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR OUTER SPACE AFFAIRS, IAWN
SMPAG FACT SHEET 2, http://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/smpag/IAWN_
SMPAG_Fact_sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/J8YU-KB4G].
101 See NEAR-EARTH OBJECTS AND PLANETARY DEFENCE, supra note 98, at 14.
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common danger. It is advisable for such standards and plans to
be established well before the confusion of impending
threats.102
NEO threats, like STM and the dangers of space debris colli-
sions, are essentially technical, non-military problems. While
they are of global concern, they do not involve the appearance
of military threats or confrontations from other states.103 The
actual management of NEO threats would require an interna-
tional decision-making authority that would work with estab-
lished protocols.
The world needs international planetary defense coordina-
tion and international norms in the form of protocols. Possible
protocols for uniform international NEO defense should reflect
the urgent, universal need for planetary defense. COPUOS is
presently preparing voluntary and tentative plans for interna-
tional coordination,104 but there is no time to lose. Protocols
could include:
(1) NEO disaster management;
(2) Emergency warning;
(3) Agreed nomenclature for NEOs;
(4) Public awareness of NEO dangers;
(5) NEO response and recovery;
(6) Procedures for dealing with different impacts of NEO
strikes, whether on land or on water;
(7) Diversion of NEOs; and
(8) Establishment of thresholds for guiding states in making
decisions and taking action.
D. OTHER INTERNATIONAL OUTER SPACE ISSUES POSSIBLY IN
NEED OF TECHNICAL NORMS105
If a decision is made to create a new international organiza-
tion to establish international norms for essential technical
space issues, such as STM, space debris, and NEO management,
then the negotiating states should have the opportunity to make
the international regulation as comprehensive as possible with-
out transgressing into regulation of military and economic is-
102 Larsen, NEOs, supra note 1, at 109.
103 Id. at 132, 136.
104 See NEAR-EARTH OBJECTS AND PLANETARY DEFENCE, supra note 98, at 10–11.
105 Note additional issues discussed in the U.S. Space Policy Directive 3, supra
note 1, at 28, 970–75.
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sues. The following space issues might be examined for that
purpose.
1. Remote Sensing
Satellite remote sensing has become a New Space business ac-
tivity that now occurs mainly through many small orbiting satel-
lites.106 Until recently, remote sensing was mainly used for
military observation.107 It is now also used for management of
agriculture, disasters, climate observations, land planning, min-
ing, and many other purposes.108 Some norms were established
by the UN in 1986 in the Principles Relating to the Remote
Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space.109 The UN Remote
Sensing Principles are not binding. Some states, like the United
States, have adopted extensive laws and regulations that often
conflict with the UN Remote Sensing Principles, yet the military
aspects of remote sensing remain strong. It is thus uncertain
whether new norms for remote sensing fit within the framework
of a new international civil regime.
2. Environmental Pollution of Outer Space110
Space pollution is currently subject to the international law
treaties as well as customary terrestrial international environ-
mental law,111 such as the Precautionary Principle112 and the ex-
isting UNGA Nuclear Power Source (NPS) Resolution.113
Space debris is often associated with environmental pollu-
tion.114 International environmental pollution in general could
therefore easily become part of the scope of a new international
106 See Herbert J. Kramer & Arthur P. Cracknell, An Overview of Small Satellites in
Remote Sensing, 29 INT’L J. REMOTE SENSING 4285, 4286 (2008).
107 See id. at 4287–89.
108 See, e.g., Zhuokun Pan et al., Remote Sensing of Agricultural Disasters Monitor-
ing: Recent Advances, 6 INT’L J. REMOTE SENSING & GEOSCIENCE 4, 4 (2017).
109 See generally G.A. Res. 41/65 (Dec. 3, 1986). The Principles are dated: signif-
icant commercial remote sensing activities had not developed at the time of
adoption in 1986, so the Principles were mostly considered for the national secur-
ity aspects of remote sensing.
110 See generally LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 11, at 245–80.
111 Id. at 245.
112 See Paul B. Larsen, Application of Precautionary Principle to the Moon, 71 J. AIR.
L. & COM. 295 (2006).
113 See G.A. Res. 47/68 (Feb. 23, 1993).
114 See Larsen, Solving the Space Debris Crisis, supra note 1; Outer Space Treaty,
supra note 10, art. IX (requiring parties to the agreement to consult before caus-
ing “potentially harmful interference with activities of other States Parties in the
peaceful exploration and use of outer space”).
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legal regime establishing international norms for the solution of
space debris problems.
3. Disaster Management: UN Platform for Space-based Information
for Disaster Management and Emergency Response (UN-
SPIDER)115
Due to the lack of an international organization, management
of the Disaster Charter for Outer Space has been relegated to
the UN Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA).116 UNOOSA
has become responsible for servicing the Disaster Charter and
has established UN-SPIDER to maintain a global information
and communication system, which provides countries that expe-
rience disasters with a central network to activate disaster assis-
tance.117 A number of countries have dedicated disaster services,
such as remote sensing, so they can provide relief immediately
after disasters strike. UN-SPIDER maintains an electronic infor-
mation portal, giving states immediate information about availa-
ble disaster resources.
If an international space organization is established, it would
be logical for that organization to house the UN-SPIDER com-
munication network and to administer the disaster relief assis-
tance functions in accordance with the standards developed by
UN-SPIDER.118
4. Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence (SETI)119
There continues to be active, international interest in finding
evidence of life on other planets. Current exploration of Mars
searches actively for SETI evidence.120 Other planets and solar
systems are also being examined. The search from Earth consists
of passive listening for possible messages from both inside and
outside the Solar System in addition to active pursuit of possible
sources of communication in outer space. Protocols for commu-
115 What Is UN-SPIDER?, UNITED NATIONS OFF. FOR OUTER SPACE AFF., http://
www.un-spider.org/about/what-is-un-spider [permalink unavailable] (last visited
Sept. 8, 2018); LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 11, at 378–82.
116 G.A. Res. 61/110, ¶ 16 (Dec. 14, 2006).
117 Id. at ¶¶ 6–15.
118 See Paul B. Larsen, The Oso Landslide: Disaster Management Law in the Space
Age, 40 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 335, 357–60 (2016) (discussing UN-
SPIDER as a part of UNOOSA).
119 See generally LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 11, ch. 17 (entitled “The Search for
Extraterrestrial Intelligence (SETI)”).
120 Id. at 498.
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nication with extraterrestrials have been developed with the sup-
port of NASA and later by the International Astronautical
Association.121 No international UN-related organization is pres-
ently charged with hosting these international activities, but an
international space organization could become the logical fo-
rum for managing protocols for communication and en-
counters with extraterrestrial beings.
5. Solar Power Satellite Systems
Huge electrical solar power satellites located in geostationary
orbit (GSO) could collect solar energy and convert it into micro-
wave beams directed at designated reception stations on
Earth.122 The potential disaster caused by downlinking the mi-
crowave beam outside of its intended target on Earth would re-
quire close monitoring of the scientific, technological, and legal
aspects of solar power satellites. Thus, norms and standards for
the construction of solar power satellites would become
necessary.
Placing the huge solar power satellites in GSO at an altitude
of 23,000 miles would require coordination with ITU123 and with
all current users of the GSO. Before placement into orbit, it
would be important to resolve whether the solar power satellites
were to be placed in orbit by individual states or by an interna-
tional cooperative organization.
If Earth were starving for electricity, the production and distri-
bution of power to the users would become important issues to
be resolved. Distribution norms would need to be negotiated
and would depend on whether the distribution would be a for-
profit endeavor, much like a commercial electrical power com-
pany, or a public benefit distribution scheme designed for equal
access for everyone on Earth. Consequently, solar power issues
should be on the agenda of an international conference on new
international operating norms for outer space.124
6. Other Civil Outer Space Subjects
An inventory of other civil outer space subjects developed
during formative negotiations would probably indicate other re-
121 Id. at 500–01.
122 Paul B. Larsen, Current Legal Issues Pertaining to Solar Power Systems, 16 SPACE
POL’Y 139, 139–42 (2000).
123 Id. at 140.
124 See generally id.
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lated problems that could be addressed with international
norms. The UNOOSA, which was originally intended by the
UNGA to service only the Committee for Peaceful Uses of
Outer, has become the administrator of space subjects.
UNOOSA administers the UN registry of space objects estab-
lished by the Registration Convention. The diplomatic confer-
ence may find it expedient to assign such administrative
functions to the international agency charged with establishing
norms for outer space.
E. ADMINISTRATION
Continued administration and oversight of the new interna-
tional norms for outer space would be important. Therefore,
the expert commissions must be standing bodies.125 It should be
expected that the space commissions would each form sub-
groups on various aspects of space debris, traffic, defense against
threatening NEOs, and other possible subjects of international
norms for civil outer space activities.
IV. STAKEHOLDER IDENTIFICATION
The large variety of stakeholders in outer space regulation
shows how important internationally uniform regulatory norms
are. As the number of stakeholders grows, it is evident that the
danger of collisions grows as well. The stakeholders are increas-
ingly aware of the need for uniform international operating
norms.
A. NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENTS
International norms, such as the ICAO aviation standards, are
established by intergovernmental compacts. After establish-
ment, the norms are implemented and enforced by governmen-
tal agencies. The governments have a direct interest in outer
space norms through their own use of outer space and are
guardians of space-related public interests, such as the availabil-
ity of national and international communication lines. National
governments also benefit from the services of non-governmental
civil outer space operators. The Directive will no doubt show the
125 The ICAO Air Navigation Commission established subgroups on all the
navigation-related problems referred to the Commission. See ICAO AIR NAVIGA-
TION COMM’N, SPECIAL 200TH SESSION COMMEMORATIVE REVIEW 6 (Fall 2015),
https://www.icao.int/about-icao/AirNavigationCommission/Documents/ANC-
200_final_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/8YNZ-JBCV].
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powerful impact that a national government may have on the
creation of norms for outer space activities.126
National governments also represent the interests of their mil-
itary authorities in establishing possible international operating
norms regulating non-governmental operators. That is so even if
the military operators are not bound by international norms es-
tablished for civil operators: the military operators will have to
know the operating rules established for civil outer space traffic
and will benefit from the resultant greater order in outer space.
They may also use the international civil norms to the extent
that they are in line with their interests. That was the lesson
learned in aviation, maritime traffic, and civil satellite telecom-
munication. The military outer space operators benefit from re-
duction of collision dangers with space debris even though the
military may reserve the right to cause more debris through mili-
tary engagements.127
Additionally, several international government authorities are
interested in outer space norms that may affect them. The ITU
presently regulates and applies its international norms to estab-
lish frequencies and related orbital slots of satellites navigating
in outer space.128 The ITU would have to coordinate its approval
of orbital slots with new norms for space traffic, space debris,
and NEOs. ICAO would be interested because non-sovereign
outer space is not clearly delineated from air space, so ICAO
norms would be relevant to outer space traffic through airspace.
Furthermore, the jurisdiction of COPUOS would be redefined
by any new international law establishing new norms for outer
space. Preparatory international negotiations establishing outer
space norms would likely take place in COPUOS. Creation of
norms for outer space could also lead to renegotiation of some
established space law, which would cause several states to hesi-
tate to agree on renegotiation.129
126 U.S. Space Policy Directive 3, supra note 1.
127 Because space technology is inherently dual use, military authorities will
want their governments to prevent important military space technology from be-
ing shared in developing international norms for outer space traffic, space debris
mitigation, and planetary defense against NEOs.
128 See Overview, INT’L TELECOMM. UNION, https://www.itu.int/en/about/
Pages/overview.aspx [https://perma.cc/CJ7M-JFQ9].
129 These negotiations would also reinforce that the norms under considera-
tion are of a technical nature and are not intended to lead to negotiation regard-
ing economic exploitation of outer space.
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B. NON-GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES
The non-governmental entities are the major object and focus
of new international norms for outer space. It is therefore most
important that their special needs and situations be understood
and expressed by their governments. Profit is the main motiva-
tion for the commercial operators, and a favorable business en-
vironment is necessary to make profit. That includes a safe,
transparent, and predictable outer space. A fundamental aspect
of private companies is that they are naturally oriented towards
international business: they shift readily from one state to an-
other depending on which state provides the best business cli-
mate, and they want their authorizing government to protect
them from interference from operators authorized by other gov-
ernments. In other words, they need internationally agreed-
upon operating norms. They also want international action to
stop and possibly reverse the increasing interferences from
space debris. However, they do not want excessive international
safety norms to restrict their economic exploitation activities.
A large number of start-up companies are venturing into busi-
ness involving outer space operation,130 and many do not ap-
pear to understand the applicable outer space legal
framework.131 Thus, companies like Swarm Technologies132 may
make erroneous assumptions, such as assuming that the Outer
Space Treaty or the ITU’s rules are inapplicable to them. Others
are determined to change the existing framework to accommo-
date new technology, economics, and politics.133
In addition, many commercial companies seek to establish
trade associations to promote their interests in future govern-
mental discussions about establishing new international outer
space norms and regimes.134 For example, the Space Data Asso-
ciation135 consists of large established satellite operating compa-
nies like Intelsat, SES, and Eutelsat. These companies form
trade associations and are well-established with a large number
of satellites that have secure frequencies and orbital slots. They
are pillars of the Satellite Industry Association and are inter-
130 See Butt, supra note 36.
131 See id.
132 See id.
133 See About SIA, SATELLITE INDUSTRY ASS’N, https://www.sia.org/about/
[https://perma.cc/P8XC-AWXA].
134 See id.
135 See Welcome to the Space Data Association, SPACE DATA ASS’N, http://
www.space-data.org/sda [https://perma.cc/8ZC9-P49Z].
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ested in expanding and defending their existing interests
against ideas that may threaten their business. These companies
want maximum freedom to do business, but they also need or-
der in outer space; however, order in outer space cannot be cre-
ated by individual competing companies.
The Commercial Smallsat Spectrum Management Association
is a group of new space operators136 largely composed of compa-
nies controlling thousands of small satellites being or about to
be launched. The names of the companies multiply and change
as they merge and new companies appear. Blacksky, CICERO,
EROS, OneWeb, Planet, Radarsat, Terra Bella, Northstar, Digi-
tal, Hawkey 30, and Kepler Communications are examples of
small satellite companies.137 These companies want to make
room in outer space for their new operations and tend to favor
an international regulatory authority that will establish order so
that they can safely do business.138
The Consortium for Execution of Rendezvous and Servicing
Operations (CONFERS)139 is directly interested in developing
industry norms for servicing satellites in orbit. They are estab-
lishing voluntary standards for the satellite servicing industry.
Airbus, Chandah Space Technologies, Intelsat General, Orbital
ATK, and SSL (a unit of Maxar Technologies and XLCatlin) are
the current participants in this association. They formed CON-
FERS at the invitation of the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency. This group is of special interest in this study of
outer space norms because the companies realized the need for
uniformity and formed their own standards for the new satellite-
servicing business.140 This illustrates how space business needs
diverse standards. Some standards, like those for satellite servic-
136 See Caleb Henry, Smallsat Companies Band Together in New Spectrum-Advocacy
Organization, SPACE NEWS (Sept. 22, 2017), http://spacenews.com/smallsat-com-
panies-band-together-in-new-spectrum-advocacy-organization/ [https://
perma.cc/Y2SV-JN72] (discussing Commercial Smallsat Spectrum Management
Association).
137 See, e.g., id.
138 Paul B. Larsen, Small Satellite Legal Issues, 82 J. AIR L. & COM. 275, 283–87
(2017).
139 See Press Release, Consortium for Execution of Rendezvous and Servicing
Operations, Industry Partners Help Establish Consortium for Satellite Servicing
Standards (May 22, 2018), available at https://www.satelliteconfers.org/wp-con
tent/uploads/2018/05/CONFERS-Press-Release-05.23.18.pdf [https://perma.
cc/E985-2JKE] [hereinafter CONFERS Press Release] (discussing CONFERS).
140 In-orbit satellite servicing business is expected to grow into a $3 billion mar-
ket over the next ten years. See Sandra Erwin, In-Orbit Services Poised to Become Big
Business, SPACE NEWS 18, June 4, 2018, at 18.
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ing, can be set by non-governmental entities themselves,141 but
standards for space traffic, space debris, and NEOs require gov-
ernment regulation.
Space launch companies have been able to launch many small
satellites together, thereby drastically lowering the launch
price.142 Some launch companies, like SpaceX and Airbus, are
both satellite operators and launch companies.143 Other new
launch companies are starting up, attracted by the new small
satellite launch opportunities.
The customers of space operators are often governments con-
tracting with private launch companies and satellite operators to
save the cost of building satellites and launch rockets. For exam-
ple, NASA contracts with private launch operators to provide
transportation to the International Space Station.144 That has
saved NASA great expense but has also made it dependent on
the availability of commercial operators. The recent SpaceX
launch of a large satellite toward Mars shows that the non-gov-
ernmental entities also become independent entrepreneurs in
outer space.145 Another feature of current space business is that
people in countries that are not space powers become depen-
dent on space operators from states that do have space capabili-
ties. For example, a small satellite communications company,
OneWeb, plans to establish a global net of about 800 small satel-
141 The best-known organization for standardization is the International Or-
ganization for Standardization (ISO). See About ISO, INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZA-
TION, https://www.iso.org/about-us.html [https://perma.cc/RHR8-9UHN]. It is
a non-governmental entity that consists of the standardization societies of 162
countries. See ISO Members, INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, https://
www.iso.org/members.html [https://perma.cc/A5YE-YU7Z]. ISO standards help
increase productivity and marketing of products.
142 See, e.g., Loren Grush, Later This Year, a SpaceX Falcon 9 Rocket Will Launch Its
Biggest Batch of Satellites Yet, THE VERGE (Aug. 6, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://
www.theverge.com/2018/8/6/17654372/spacex-falcon-9-spaceflight-industries-
small-satellite-rideshare [https://perma.cc/8B9R-UP54].
143 See About SpaceX, SPACEX, https://www.spacex.com/about [https://
perma.cc/45MR-QV9A]; We Are Airbus, AIRBUS, https://www.airbus.com/com
pany/we-are-airbus.html [ttps://perma.cc/C3AY-A6WB].
144 See Steven Siceloff, NASA Chooses American Companies to Transport U.S. Astro-
nauts to International Space Station, NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN., https://
www.nasa.gov/content/nasa-chooses-american-companies-to-transport-us-astro-
nauts-to-international-space-station [https://perma.cc/3BX8-XF93] (last up-
dated Aug. 7, 2017).
145 See Mike Wall, SpaceX Launches Communications Satellite on 2nd-Ever Flight of
New Rocket, SPACE.COM (July 22, 2018, 2:25 AM), https://www.space.com/41244-
spacex-launches-communications-satellite-telesat.html [https://perma.cc/CR6G-
MR4C].
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lites to provide internet access to developing countries through
the use of small satellites.146 These countries will then become
dependent on OneWeb for internet access.
V. EXISTING SPACE LAW AFFECTING NORMS FOR
SPACE TRAFFIC, SPACE DEBRIS, AND NEOS
A new international organization charged with establishing
norms for civil actors in outer space would be subject to existing
international laws and would have to ensure existing laws are
reflected in the establishment of these new norms.
A. UN CHARTER
In the absence of a special UN sub-agency for outer space, the
responsibility for international problems related to outer space
traffic and debris will remain with the UN. Its legal authority is
the UN Charter, which mandates the UN “to maintain interna-
tional peace and security.”147 The UNGA established the perma-
nent COPUOS as a forum for discussion of outer space issues.148
COPUOS has been the forum for negotiation of the five basic
space law treaties and for several UNGA resolutions that have
become guidelines for the UN member states.
B. OUTER SPACE TREATY149
New international civil norms on space debris, traffic conjunc-
tions, and defending Earth from NEOs must comply with the
Outer Space Treaty, the foundational space law treaty. It states
that (1) outer space must be used for the benefit of all countries
without discrimination;150 (2) outer space cannot be appropri-
ated by any state by any means;151 (3) weapons of mass destruc-
tion in outer space are prohibited;152 (4) states are responsible
for their non-governmental activities in outer space, which must
be authorized and supervised by the appropriate national
146 Space: A Sudden Light, THE ECONOMIST (Aug. 25, 2016), http://
www.economist.com/technology-quarterly/2016-25-08/space-2016 [https://
perma.cc/SVT5-55AS].
147 U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 1.
148 See G.A. Res. 1348 (13 Dec. 1958); G.A. Res. 1472 (12 Dec. 1959).
149 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 10; see LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 11, at 49;
HOBE ET AL., COLOGNE COMMENTARY VOL. I, supra note 12.
150 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 10, art. I.
151 Id. art. II.
152 Id. art. IV.
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state;153 (5) in outer space, states retain jurisdiction over space
objects on their registry;154 and (6) states must avoid harmful
contamination of Earth and pay due regard to the correspond-
ing interests of other states.155 Any norms that would be estab-
lished regarding space debris, outer space traffic, and NEOs
would be subject to the law as laid out in the Outer Space
Treaty.
C. RETURN OF SPACE OBJECTS
The Agreement on Aid to Astronauts and Return of Space
Objects requires states and their non-governmental operators to
give assistance to astronauts.156 Under the Agreement, states
shall return, or place at the disposal of the launching state, any
lost space objects and their component parts.157 However, ob-
jects of hazardous nature need only be placed at the disposal of
the launching state.158 The launching states must pay any costs
incurred by the receiving state.159 This treaty is significant be-
cause it specifically includes component parts of satellites in the
same category as space objects. Thus, space debris, being com-
ponent parts, may legally be characterized as space objects. Re-
turn of space debris assumes that the receiving state can identify
the owner, which may be difficult, if not impossible. Any norms
regarding space debris are also likely to conform with this treaty.
D. LIABILITY CONVENTION
States and their non-governmental operators that launch ob-
jects into outer space are broadly liable for damages caused to
other states party to the Outer Space Treaty.160 However, most
states are now parties to the later and superseding Liability Con-
vention, which provides for absolute state liability for damages
caused in the air and on the surface of the Earth.161 Under the
Liability Convention, liability is based on proof of fault for dam-
153 Id. art. VI.
154 Id. art. VIII.
155 Id. art. IX.
156 Rescue and Return Agreement, supra note 10, art. 2; LYALL & LARSEN, supra
note 11, at 89; HOBE ET AL., COLOGNE COMMENTARY VOL. II, supra note 13, at 1.
157 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 10, art. V.
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Id. art. VII.
161 Liability Convention, supra note 10, art. II.
770 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [83
ages caused in outer space.162 The Liability Convention also de-
fines the term “space objects” as including component parts of a
space object as well as its launch vehicle and its parts.163 Launch-
ing states are liable for damages caused by their non-govern-
mental entities. Although launching states are liable for debris
damage, it could be difficult to establish ownership and fault
under the Liability Convention unless the debris included large
identifiable pieces. Lastly launching states are only liable for
damages caused by direct impacts. Most states, including the
United States, do not recognize liability for indirect damages
under the Liability Convention.
E. REGISTRATION CONVENTION164
The Registration Convention requires launching states to reg-
ister space objects in the UN registry, which is an important,
publicly accessible database.165 Launching states are also re-
quired to register space objects in their national registries.166
The purpose of registration is to clarify which countries exercise
jurisdiction and control of space objects and, consequently, can
be held responsible for them.167 Importantly, the Registration
Convention defines space object to include component parts of
the space objects and their launch vehicles.168 NEOs fall outside
of the definition of space objects and are thus not subject to the
Registration Convention. It would be an important safety im-
provement if known NEOs were registered in the UN registry
database as soon as discovered. Alternatively, a separate UN
database registry could be established for orbital locations of
NEOs to be publicly filed.169
162 Id. art. III.
163 Id. art. I. However, NEOs are not considered space objects under the Liabil-
ity Convention.
164 UN Registration Convention, supra note 10; see LYALL & LARSEN, supra note
11, at 89; HOBE ET AL., COLOGNE COMMENTARY VOL. II, supra note 13, at 1.
165 UN Registration Convention, supra note 10, art. III.
166 Id. art. II.
167 Id.; see LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 11, at 89; HOBE ET AL., COLOGNE COM-
MENTARY VOL. II, supra note 13, at 1.
168 UN Registration Convention, supra note 10, art. I.
169 Larsen, NEOs, supra note 1, at 377–78.
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F. MOON AGREEMENT170
The Moon Agreement applies to all celestial bodies within the
Solar System (except for Earth); therefore, it applies to NEOs.
However, it only applies among the eighteen parties to the
Agreement. Much of the Moon Agreement is a repetition of the
Outer Space Treaty. For example, Article IX of the Outer Space
Treaty requires states to pay “due regard” to the corresponding
interests of other states; a similar provision exists in the Moon
Agreement’s Article 2. However, the principle that the Moon
and celestial bodies are the common heritage of mankind is
new.171 This would be an economic exploitation issue to be reg-
ulated separately, as provided in Moon Agreement Article 11(5).
Economic exploitation should not be included in the new inter-
national regime establishing safety norms regarding space deb-
ris, space traffic, and NEOs.172
G. ITU LEGAL REGIME
The ITU is a sub-agency of the UN. It regulates civil uses of
radiofrequencies in outer space, including orbital slots of those
satellites being navigated by use of radiofrequencies.173 The ITU
is charged with removing radio interferences with users’ access
to those frequencies. Collisions in outer space may interfere
with ITU management of assigned frequencies and orbital slots,
so it would benefit from the establishment of international
norms. The ITU would need to know about possible interfer-
ences by existing space debris that could endanger their satel-
lites and orbital slots. Thus, the ITU is vitally involved in all
170 Moon Agreement, supra note 10. Eighteen states are now parties to the
Moon Agreement. Several states have joined recently. These states are treaty-
bound to observe the Moon Agreement in their relations with each other.
171 Id. art. XI.
172 See discussion supra Section I. Note that the details of the economic regime
for economic exploitation of outer space is further detailed in Moon Agreement
Article 11. Specifically, Section (7)(a) discusses orderly and safe development of
the natural resources; Section (7)(b) governs natural management of those re-
sources; Section (7)(c) controls expansion of opportunities in use of those re-
source; and Section (7)(d) mandates equitable sharing in the benefits with
special consideration given to the developing countries and to those countries
which have contributed to exploration of those resources. Moon Agreement,
supra note 10, art. 11(7).
173 ITU Constitution, supra note 34, art. 1. The Federal Communications Com-
mission coordinates with the ITU regarding use of radiofrequencies. See Christen-
sen & Wolny, supra note 87; see also LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 11, at ch. 8
(entitled Radio and the International Telecommunication Union).
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issues involving space collisions and space debris. The ITU is
also involved with assisting in communication relief after disas-
ters happen.174
H. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAWS175
New civil international space debris, space traffic, and NEO
norms would be subject to customary international law. Custom-
ary international law is defined by Article 38 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice as “general practice accepted as
law” by the states.176 Thus, polluters, whether they be states or
non-governmental entities, may be held responsible for dam-
ages caused by their space debris pollution. They may also be
held responsible for failure to observe the Precautionary Princi-
ple requiring states and non-governmental entities to exercise
extraordinary caution in deciding whether to launch space ob-
jects that may cause space debris or that are likely to collide with
outer space objects.177
I. UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS
The series of UNGA resolutions relating to space debris, space
traffic, and NEOs is important for establishing norms for civil
users.178 While UNGA resolutions are not binding like treaties,
they tend to establish norms for the states to adopt as binding
regulations. The following rules are particularly important to
consider.
1. The IADC Space Debris Guidelines as Approved by COPUOS and
Enacted as UNGA Resolution 62/101 on January 11,
2008179
The IADC guidelines have been adopted by major space pow-
ers as mandatory domestic regulations, but there is not uniform
application because the states have accepted the guidelines dif-
174 ITU Constitution, supra note 34, art. 46 (requiring ITU members to render
assistance in disasters); see Tampere Convention on the Provision of Telecommu-
nication Resources for Disaster Mitigation and Relief Operations art. 4, June 18,
1998, 2296 U.N.T.S. 5.
175 LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 11, at 63–73.
176 Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, ¶ 1.
177 See Larsen, Application of Precautionary Principle, supra note 112.
178 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 41/65 (Dec. 3, 1986); G.A. Res. 61/110 (Dec. 14, 2006).
179 See G.A. Res. 62/101 (Jan. 10, 2008); see also Johnson, supra note 73;
STEPHEN HOBE ET AL., COLOGNE COMMENTARY ON SPACE LAW (VOL. III), 605
(2015).
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ferently. Agreement exists among the space debris experts that
the IADC space debris guidelines should be further strength-
ened in order to limit additional generation of space debris.180
These guidelines would be an excellent starting point for new
binding, uniform space debris norms to be implemented by the
states.
2. The UNGA Resolution on the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in
Outer Space: UNGA Resolution 47/68 of December 14,
1992181
UN Resolution 47/68 is relevant to the establishment of
norms for use of nuclear power sources (NPS), including the
creation guidelines for reducing the generation of dangerous
NPS debris.182 The UN Resolution concerns the prevention of
NPS accidents happening in outer space. NPS contamination
may also occur if an NPS-powered satellite disintegrates on im-
pact with Earth. A precedent for such an event was established
in 1978 when Kosmos 954, a Russian NPS satellite, crashed and
scattered NPS debris over the tundra in Northern Canada.183
Russia accepted responsibility for the debris damage, most of
which remains where it landed in 1978.
3. UNGA Resolution 62/101 of December 17, 2007:
Recommendation on Enhancing the Practice of States and
International Intergovernmental Organizations in
Registering Space Objects184
Registration of space debris, particularly large identifiable
space debris, remains a serious problem. The Registration Con-
vention (as well as the Liability Convention) governs space ob-
jects, which is explicitly defined as including component parts.
Registration requirements were construed to include space deb-
180 See Larsen, Solving the Space Debris Crisis, supra note 1.
181 LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 11, at 255; HOBE ET AL., COLOGNE COMMENTARY
VOL. III, supra note 179, at 401; see also Claim for Damage Caused by Cosmos 954,
Can.-U.S.S.R., Feb. 8, 1978, 18 I.L.M. 899; Protocol on Settlement of Canada’s
Claim for Damages Caused by Cosmos 954, Can.-U.S.S.R., Apr. 2, 1981, 20 I.L.M.
689; LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 11, at 255 (section entitled Nuclear Power).
182 See G.A. Res. 47/68 (Dec. 14, 1992).
183 See Marc Montgomery, Canada History: Jan 24, 1978, Soviet Radiation Across
the Arctic, RADIO CAN. INT’L (Jan. 24, 2017), http://www.rcinet.ca/en/2017/01/
24/canada-history-jan-24-1978-soviet-radiation-across-the-arctic/ [https://
perma.cc/USQ7-P8LR].
184 See UN Registration Convention, supra note 10; LYALL & LARSEN, supra note
11, at 95(i); HOBE ET AL., COLOGNE COMMENTARY VOL. III, supra note 179, at 401.
774 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [83
ris in the early history of the Registration Convention. In the
beginning of the space age, states, like the United States, regis-
tered space debris with the UN Registry, thereby acknowledging
ownership and responsibility for their space debris. States dis-
continued registering space debris as it multiplied and identify-
ing the smallest parts was impossible. This has created a
problem in locating the small debris and identifying ownership
of and responsibility for them. New international guidance on
space debris registration is needed to establish norms for identi-
fication and assignment of responsibility for limiting and remov-
ing space debris.
4. UNGA Resolution 59/115 of December 10, 2004: Application of
the Concept of the “Launching State”
The Registration Convention and the Liability Convention
place responsibilities on the launching states to register satellites
and component parts in the UN registry as well as for launching
states to assume liability under the Liability Convention.185 In
both Conventions, the meaning of the term “launching state” is
very broad.186 It is defined to include four categories of states:
(1) the states that launch space objects; (2) the states that pro-
cure the launching of space objects; (3) the states from whose
territory space objects are launched; and (4) the states from
whose facilities space objects are launched.187 All four categories
are “launching states.” UNGA Resolution 59/115 encourages
states to arrange and regulate the states’ identification of the
one state that authorizes the launch and supervises the satellite
after launch so that it is clear which state is required to author-
ize and continuously supervise an individual space object.188 An
international norm on this issue should clarify and establish in-
ternational uniformity. UNGA resolutions relating to space deb-
ris, space traffic, and NEOs are important for a new
international organization that is establishing norms for civil
users.
185 See UN Registration Convention, supra note 10; Liability Convention, supra
note 10, art. II.
186 Compare UN Registration Convention, supra note 10, art. I(a), with Liability
Convention, supra note 10, art. I(c).
187 UN Registration Convention, supra note 10, art. I(a); Liability Convention,
supra note 10, art. I(c); see HOBE ET AL., COLOGNE COMMENTARY VOL. II, supra
note 13, at 363. Note that space objects are considered to include component
parts under both treaties.
188 See G.A. Res. 59/115 (Jan. 25, 2005).
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VI. COMPARING INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK
OPTIONS FOR MINIMUM CIVIL TECHNICAL
SPACE NORMS
This section will examine and compare the strengths and
weaknesses of a number of existing organizations as potential
models for a new international organization to establish interna-
tional norms for resolving space debris, STM, and NEO
problems.
A. THE ICAO MODEL FOR ESTABLISHING NEW
INTERNATIONAL NORMS
The ICAO is a sub-agency of the UN, but it is authorized by a
separate treaty, the Chicago Convention.189 ICAO’s main task is
to establish international norms (called standards and proce-
dures) for international civil aviation.190 If the ICAO model for
establishing international norms for space activities prevails,
such norms would be applicable as minimum standards in outer
space.191 Since there is no sovereignty in outer space, these in-
ternational norms adopted for outer space would become fully
applicable as drafted and adopted by the international space or-
ganization. In this way, all civil traffic in outer space would navi-
gate by the same norms and would be subject to the same
uniform space debris regulations.
International norms could require all new launches to reduce
or even cease adding more debris. Norms could be adopted to
reduce the existing amount of space debris, in particular large
debris. The goal would be to prevent the Kessler space debris
syndrome from closing access to outer space. In addition, states
would adopt joint procedures for coordinating and defending
against NEOs threating collision with Earth and for dealing with
disasters caused by NEOs that cannot be deflected. States with
special needs would be able to file special deviations to meet
their needs.192
189 Chicago Convention, supra note 15, art. 37 (“Each contracting State under-
takes to collaborate in securing the highest practicable degree of uniformity in
regulations, standards, procedures, and organization in relation to aircraft, per-
sonnel, airways[,] and auxiliary services in all matters in which such uniformity
will facilitate and improve air navigation.”).
190 About ICAO, INT’L CIVIL AVIATION ORG., http://www.icao.int/about-
icao.pages/default-aspx [https://perma.cc/9KRM-RG4P].
191 Chicago Convention, supra note 15, arts. 37, 38.
192 Id. art. 38.
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In using the ICAO model to establish a new international civil
space organization that would create international minimum
norms for civil space activities, it would be necessary to appoint
standing expert commissions on the subjects for which norms
were to be established.193 The expert commissions would recom-
mend mandatory international norms to be adopted by a deci-
sion-making council, similar to the ICAO Council. Following the
ICAO model,194 membership on the Space Council should pro-
vide adequate representation of the major space powers, such as
the United States, Russia, China, India, and the ESA, and ensure
that all major geographic areas of the world are represented on
the council. The size of the council would depend on the
amount of activity prescribed by the enabling treaty, but in prin-
ciple, the council should be small. Assemblies of all the member
states would meet to set fundamental policy.195
The ICAO model has proven effective and successful in estab-
lishing norms for aviation. ICAO has managed to preserve its
technical nature and not be contaminated by international
politics. The standing expert ICAO International Air Navigation
Commission has formulated and updated norms as necessary.
The urgent and continuing need for studying existing norms
and updating them as the technology and environment change
is particularly important for space debris. The world is in need
of better rules for new debris, and much research is needed to
remove existing debris and prevent it from multiplying as pre-
dicted by the Kessler Syndrome.
In comparison with the weak decision-making machinery of
COPUOS, the ICAO decision-making authority shines. Expert
drafting commissions would be able to focus expeditiously on
new problems and to produce recommendations for a decision-
making council. The council would operate by majority but tend
to act in unison.
The space industry should be given an adequate role in shap-
ing norms for its own activities. Incorporating industry input
193 For example, space traffic, space debris, and NEO issues would each re-
quire a separate standing commission.
194 Chicago Convention, supra note 15, art. 50. Extending ICAO jurisdiction
and standards to outer space has been considered. See generally The Need for an
Integrated Regulatory Regime for Aviation and Space, in STUDIES IN SPACE POLICY (Ram
S. Jakhu et al. eds., 2011). That idea has not been accepted. See Ruwantissa
Abeyratne, Bringing Commercial Space Transport Regulatory Regime Under ICAO: Is it
Feasible?, 62 ZLW 387 (2013); LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 11, at 152.
195 Chicago Convention, supra note 15, art. 43.
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into decision-making would happen in several ways: (1) industry
leaders should be invited by their own government to contribute
to position papers for upcoming meetings of any of the deci-
sion-making bodies; (2) industry representatives should be in-
vited to serve on national delegations to international meetings;
and (3) knowledgeable international industry observers should
be invited to participate in international meetings.196
The ICAO-modeled decision-making organization would be
costly. However, that cost would have to be measured against the
cost of major collisions in outer space and their disastrous con-
sequences. Space debris is accumulating fast, and outer space
collisions with space debris will happen more and more fre-
quently unless action is taken.197 The ultimate result of inaction
would be foreclosure of access to outer space.198 Failure to act is
not an option because the debris problem will be so much more
difficult to resolve later than it is now.199 The same argument
applies to avoidance of space traffic conjunctions. Even NEOs
require expedited action. Asteroid orbits must be identified and
recorded. Their orbits must be studied to observe whether they
threaten Earth. International protocols for planetary defense
must be prepared. It is increasingly apparent that neither indus-
try nor government can wait any longer to adopt uniform norms
for their outer space activities. It is now not only a business re-
quirement but also a public safety requirement.
B. PRESENT COPUOS AS THE MODEL FOR ESTABLISHING NEW
INTERNATIONAL NORMS
The major function of COPUOS is to advise the UNGA on all
outer space issues.200 In the absence of a specific UN sub-agency
on outer space issues, like ICAO on aviation, IMO on maritime,
and ITU on telecommunication issues, COPUOS is the interna-
tional forum for discussion of all international space issues.
Those issues are plentiful because outer space, being non-sover-
196 Industry participation is common for ICAO working group meetings (the
author is a former U.S. delegate to ICAO-related meetings and speaks from per-
sonal experience).
197 See U.S. Space Policy Directive 3, supra note 1.
198 See Kessler et al., supra note 53.
199 ESA studies show that delay of redial action until 2060 would be less effec-
tive than action now. ESA BR-336 Space Debris: The ESA Approach, EURO. SPACE
AGENCY (Apr. 11, 2017), http://www.esa.int/About_Us/ESA_Publications/
ESA_Publications_Brochures/ESA_BR-336_Space_Debris_The_ESA_Approach
[https://perma.cc/ECD9-399R].
200 See G.A. Res. 1348 (XIII) (Dec. 13, 1958).
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eign, is inherently international. Originally established in
1958,201 COPUOS became the forum for negotiation of the
space law treaties and several important UNGA resolutions on
outer space. The IADC space debris guidelines202 were
processed by COPUOS, submitted to the UNGA for recom-
mended adoption, and then adopted by UNGA in 2007.203
COPUOS is also the forum for discussion of STM issues. Fur-
ther, COPUOS actively discusses NEO dangers and has recently
created two advisory groups on NEO issues, International Aster-
oid Warning Network and Space Mission Planning Advisory
Group.204
COPUOS’s strength is that it has an actual mandate from the
UNGA to examine outer space issues. On that basis, COPUOS
recommends UNGA resolutions. UN member states are able to
contribute to these recommendations and have benefitted from
adopting them as their domestic laws and regulations. COPUOS
activities on space debris guidelines, STM, and examination of
NEOs are evidence of the benefits of COPUOS to outer space
activities.
The question is whether the COPUOS activities sufficiently
meet the needs for international outer space management and
regulation. COPUOS, aided by UNOOSA, has only recommend-
atory authority; it does not have authority to adopt mandatory
uniform norms by which operators can safely accomplish their
business activities in outer space. Most importantly, COPUOS
does not have decision-making authority. The recent drastic in-
crease in outer space activities requires active management and
operating norms. The COPUOS organization is much too slow
and cumbersome to establish and administer operating norms
for space debris and space traffic and to prevent NEO conjunc-
tions. COPUOS also lacks expert standing committees like the
Air Navigation Committee205 or the ITU Regulation Board.206
The new space problems are in fast motion and need consistent
201 Id.; see also LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 11, at 13–18.
202 See IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines, supra note 83.
203 G.A. Res. 62/217 (Dec. 22, 2007).
204 NEAR-EARTH OBJECTS AND PLANETARY DEFENCE, supra note 98, at 12–14.
205 Chicago Convention, supra note 15, arts. 56, 57; see discussion of ICAO,
supra Section VI.A.
206 ITU Constitution, supra note 34, art. 14.
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monitoring and action. They cannot wait for the annual
COPUOS meetings.207
C. ITU AS MODEL FOR INTERNATIONAL SPACE NORMS208
The ITU is also a sub-agency of the UN and, like ICAO, was
established by its own constitution and treaty.209 It is virtually
independent. ITU originated in 1865,210 and its treaty provisions
have been modified as new technology has developed.211
The ITU regulations are treaty obligations and thus differ
from the ICAO standards, which are binding regulations with-
out being treaty obligations. The ITU regulations are adopted
by ITU World Assemblies212 and, as compared to ICAO standers,
are less flexible and harder to amend and update because
changes in regulations require adoption by a new assembly.
Thus, the ITU process of establishing norms tends to be slower
than the ICAO mode.
Applying existing radio regulations, the ITU Radio Regula-
tions Board decides whether individual applications for use of
frequencies conflict with existing users and would cause radio
interference.213 The Board meets four times a year.214 With only
twelve members, it is a small group, but each member must have
expertise in the subject matter before the Board.215 All their ex-
penses are paid by the ITU, but they are not ITU employees.216
207 COPUOS meets once every year. Meanwhile, new ICAO traffic norms were
expeditiously developed after the disappearance of the Malaysian Airlines plane
over the Indian Ocean. ICAO quickly adopted new standard requiring aircraft to
report position every fifteen minutes. See Malaysia Airlines Flight 370, WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Malaysia_Airlines_Flight_370#Aircraft_tracking
[https://perma.cc/ZUM3-CE43] (citing Joan Lowy, Airlines Slow to Adopt Safety
Technologies after MH370, PHYS.ORG (Mar. 4, 2016), https://phys.org/news/2016-
03-airlines-safety-technologies-mh370.html).
208 ITU Constitution, supra note 34.
209 See id.
210 Constitution and Convention, INT’L TELECOMM. UNION, https://www.itu.int/
en/history/Pages/ConstitutionAndConvention.aspx [https://perma.cc/7X77-
CQD4].
211 LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 11, ch. 8 (entitled Radio and the International
Telecommunication Union).
212 Id.





216 LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 11, ch. 8 (entitled Radio and the International
Telecommunication Union).
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The ITU model could establish norms for space debris, traffic
conjunctions, and planetary defense against NEOs. However,
the ITU model would be less flexible than the ICAO model be-
cause norms would be developed at world assemblies of parties
to the organizational treaty.217 The proposed norms would not
necessarily be of interest, nor fully appreciated or understood
by, delegates to the world assemblies called to adopt the regula-
tions. These urgent issues would be better understood by the
standing expert committees established under the ICAO model.
The ITU model would be less expensive to organize and oper-
ate than the ICAO model, but its deficiency in resolving the ur-
gent space debris, space traffic, and NEO problems would
probably not result in successful resolution of the problems.
D. NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AS MODELS FOR
MINIMUM SPACE NORMS
Space industry operators are concerned that national and in-
ternational government-established operating norms may be too
restrictive and may kill off the inventive start-up space business
initiatives now appearing in the marketplace.
No one state or non-governmental entity can appropriate or
assert sovereignty over outer space. The Outer Space Treaty Ar-
ticle IX requires states to pay due regard to the corresponding
activities of other states.218 But that requirement does not give
one state regulatory authority over the business authorities of
other states. Article IX merely requires appropriate interna-
tional consultations.219
Individual space businesses need room to experiment.220 At
the same time, they are concerned about the intense competi-
tion and the need for some basic safety and traffic rules. An-
other complication is that the competing space businesses are of
different nationalities, and the space businesses authorized by
one state may receive inadequate protection from their author-
izing state against competing businesses authorized by another
state. The nations have to coordinate in order to establish order
and basic operating rules for non-sovereign outer space by vol-
untary agreement.
217 Id.
218 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 10, art. IX.
219 Id. arts. II, IX.
220 U.S. Space Policy Directive 3, supra note 1.
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Several operators have sought to join together in associations
for their own protection and coordination. A good example is
the Space Data Association, in which large space operators like
Intelsat, SES, and Euelsat have joined with large manufacturers
such as Airbus, and even some space agencies like NASA and the
German DLR, to pool information about traffic in outer
space.221 They have formed subcommittees on urgent issues
such as safety, procedural developments, and interference with
radio frequencies.222 However, the large number of small satel-
lite operators have tended to form their own association repre-
senting New Space. It is recognized that industry standard-
setting organizations, such as the International Standardization
Organization (ISO),223 and the new space standardization or-
ganization, CONFERS,224 have important roles for setting prod-
uct standards for the space industry. However, the norms
needed for management of space traffic, space debris, and
NEOs require minimum government coordination among the
states to establish international uniformity. Several industry ob-
servers call for some kind of international policing of outer
space.225
The private associations can only depend on the goodwill of
their competitors in obeying and complying with association
rules. Private associations have no inherent police powers for
enforcement other than legal action for breach of contract.226
Enforcement of contracts may depend on national laws and on
national courts that may favor domestic business over foreign
business. Furthermore, associations may be restricted by na-
tional antitrust and anti-monopoly laws.
Conflicting with the idea of operators working in unison for
their common good is the proposition that space operators are
basically in business for individual profit. Thus, an individual
business may not be willing to sacrifice its profit motives for the
sake of public safety. That becomes the nub of the question of
whether to leave safety in outer space to be resolved by the non-
221 SPACE DATA ASS’N, http://www.space-data.org/sda [https://perma.cc/
3F3N-MLDS].
222 Committees and Working Groups, SPACE DATA ASS’N, http://www.space-
data.org/sda/committees-and-working-groups/ [https://perma.cc/3S3P-
MU7D].
223 See About ISO, INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, https://www.iso.org/
about-us.html [https://perma.cc/RZ9G-KDFN].
224 See CONFERS Press Release, supra note 139.
225 Klotz, Space Cop, supra note 38, at 19.
226 Id.
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governmental entities: each of the operators will always be moti-
vated by self-interest. A neutral policing authority would there-
fore be more acceptable to direct traffic than competing
business operators.
Importantly, the individual national governmental authorities
do not have exclusive policing authority in outer space. The
only effective solution is to establish international minimum op-
erating norms for space debris generation, space traffic, and
planetary defense. It appears that, for space business to succeed,
international norms with adequate input from business opera-
tors will be the best solution for these urgent public safety
problems for space business to succeed.
Standards and norms are commercial necessities. They enable
businesses to satisfy a larger market demand for their products
and services. Some technical standards and norms can be estab-
lished by the commercial interests without government involve-
ment, but others require minimum governmental regulation
and oversight. Space traffic norms will benefit business enter-
prises, but they require international coordination and policing
to assure uniformity. Reduction and elimination of space debris
is another activity that requires international coordination com-
bined with national enforcement. Planetary defense against
threatening NEOs is yet another area beyond the ability of com-
mercial enterprises to control. These three space activities re-
quiring minimum government safety norms will help businesses
prosper and allow space exploration to continue.
VII. APPRAISAL AND CONCLUSION
A. APPRAISAL
The time has been reached when international coordination
of safety in outer space is necessary.227 Norms for outer space
are required not only so that commercial non-governmental op-
erators (who have only recently appeared) can safely do busi-
ness in outer space. The need for norms is greater than that—
the entire Earth-space infrastructure needs greater order. Com-
mon minimum international rules need to be established at this
stage of space development. Fortunately, there are precedents
for handling this dilemma. After World War II, basic standards
were established to avoid collisions of airplanes.228 International
227 LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 11, at 270.
228 About ICAO, supra note 190.
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maritime standards were also established.229 Basic standards for
the use of radiofrequencies were developed by the ITUs which
also regulates orbital location of space objects being navigated
by use of radiofrequencies.230 The last of these is the most rele-
vant because it initiated standard-setting for space activities.
Another important, relevant precedent was established by the
decision not to include the military. The ITU, ICAO, and IMO
standards were made applicable only to civil activities.231 Military
activities were not bound by the civil norms; however, in the
long run, the military operators found it advantageous to adopt
the civil norms to the extent possible in order to avoid possible
collisions. The military operators realized that this accommoda-
tion was to their advantage as well. That kind of civil accommo-
dation with the military operators is the only way that orderly
norms can be adopted for outer space.
A third precedent for civil norms for space traffic, space deb-
ris, and NEOs comes from the separation of space exploration
from economic exploitation addressed in the Outer Space
Treaty and the Moon Agreement.232 Consequently, the lesson
from these precedents is that civil norms for outer space should
concern safety and not apply to economic exploitation. That dis-
tinction has worked well in aviation, maritime practice, and tele-
communication. It would also work well for outer space traffic,
space debris reduction, and planetary defense.
Individual states have adequate flexibility under the ICAO
model.233 States can file individual deviations from the interna-
tional standards, and the individual states are fully in charge of
enforcement of the mandatory standards. There is no enforce-
ment by international authorities.
Establishing new norms for civil activities in outer space would
require negotiation of a new treaty regime using the ICAO
model. Like the Chicago Convention, it would create standing
commissions to prepare and police norms. The drafts of these
norms would have to be approved by a representative governing
council and include an escape valve for individual states, al-
lowing necessary deviations from the common standards and op-
229 Introduction to IMO, INT’L MARITIME ORG., www.imo.org/en/about/pages/
default.aspx [https://perma.cc/3WBC-AH46].
230 See Overview, supra note 128.
231 ITU Constitution, supra note 34, art. 48.
232 See discussion supra notes 9–14. Note that the norms established by ICAO,
IMO, and ITU are all essentially safety related.
233 Chicago Convention, supra note 15, art. 38.
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erating procedures.234 The decision under U.S. Space Policy
Directive 3235 to establish national STM is a step towards uni-
form management, but the growth of international space activity
clearly points to the need for international uniformity. Outer
space activities are inherently international, and only interna-
tional norms and standards can reduce space debris and possi-
ble collisions.
Consequently, management of standards for space traffic,
space debris reduction, and planetary defense against NEOs
would be carved away from COPUOS. COPUOS would continue
to deal with all other space issues. Basic common safety norms
would apply in non-sovereign outer space. Commercial opera-
tors would be able to move safely, the entire Earth-space infra-
structure would be secure for use, and outer space would
continue to be accessible for exploration by mankind.
B. CONCLUSION
Based on review of four different models for establishing in-
ternational minimum civil norms for space traffic, space debris,
and planetary defense problems, the following conclusions may
be drawn:
(1) ICAO Model: Aviation experience with the ICAO model
shows that establishment of standing expert committees
making recommendations to a decision-making council is
the most effective way to create mandatory norms for
technical space issues. These international norms would
need to be implemented by individual member states.
(2) COPUOS: Existing experience with COPUOS shows that
it is neither designed nor intended to be a decision-mak-
ing body capable of establishing mandatory norms.
(3) The ITU Model: Experience with the ITU model shows
that it can produce norms for the relevant problems but
that acceptable norms established by world assemblies
that are administered by a small geographically represen-
tative board are probably not the best solution. The con-
tinuing need for and supervision of detailed norms is
more than the world assemblies can produce; standing
expert committees are better suited for this task. Further-
more, a standing body like the ICAO Council is needed
to make final decisions about acceptable norms.
234 Id.
235 U.S. Space Policy Directive 3, supra note 1.
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(4) Effective non-government entities’ regulation of space
debris, space traffic, and NEO protection is not possible.
The multitude of non-governmental entities, each moti-
vated by profit as well as healthy competition among the
operators, indicates that a government-directed interna-
tional model such as the ICAO model would be more ef-
fective. However, non-governmental operators must
participate in formulation of norms in order to ensure
the users’ needs for order are fulfilled and that their busi-
ness incentives are respected and protected.
It is thus concluded that efficient international norms are neces-
sary and that they can best be established by a strong interna-
tional organization based on the ICAO model.236
236 The establishment of mandatory international norms for space debris,
space traffic, and planetary defense against NEOs would require a treaty like the
Convention on International Civil Aviation that established ICAO. The treaty
would create an assembly, a decision-making council, and expert commissions.
The council and commissions would be standing bodies. The council would have
representation from the major space powers as well appropriate geographical
representation. Decisions would be by majority votes.
